A STATE OF WAR EXIST BETWEEN CHINA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

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  Since there is a de facto China-American war, the United States should start to take China’s greatest national strength—its export-oriented, booming economic-growth model—and transform it into a major military weakness. To do so, the United States would implement a naval blockade of China that attempted to choke off most of China’s maritime trade. Under the right conditions, the United States might be able to secure victory by debilitating China’s economy severely enough to bring it to the negotiating table. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Yet until recently, a blockade strategy was largely overlooked, perhaps because economic warfare strategies seem inherently misguided given the close commercial ties between China and the United States. But if a serious conflict between the two nations erupted, then their immediate security interests would quickly override their trade interdependence and wreak enormous economic damage on both sides, regardless of whether a blockade were employed.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Even if a blockade is never executed, its viability would still impact American and Chinese policies for deterrence reasons. The United States’ regional strategy is predicated on the belief that a favorable military balance deters attempts to change the status quo by force, thus reassuring allies and upholding strategic stability. The viability of a blockade influences this calculus, and can accordingly affect American and Chinese actions—both military and nonmilitary—that are based on perceptions of it. If a naval blockade is a feasible strategy, it strengthens the American system of deterrence and dilutes any potential attempts by China to coerce the United States or its allies. Moreover, if a blockade’s viability can be clearly enunciated, it would also enhance crisis stability and dampen the prospects of escalation due to misunderstandings—on either side—about the regional balance of power. In short, as Elbridge Colby put it: “the old saw remains true, that the best way to avoid war is to prepare for it.”
  
  
  
  
  While a blockade is not a priori impossible or irrelevant in any situation, it is also not a ready tool in the American arsenal and would be feasible mainly within certain boundaries. Most importantly, many commentators miss the fact that a blockade is a context-dependent strategy, one that crucially depends on the regional environment.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  More importantly, though, a blockade strategy would depend on the cooperation of several third parties in the region. After all, China’s trade is borne on the seas largely as a result of economic considerations rather than physical limitations; if China were blockaded, it would turn to the countries on its borders for help.
  
  
  
  
  While many of its neighbors would be unable to make a strategic difference because of their rugged geography or their small size, three could prove vital: India, Japan, and Russia. The latter two would be important in helping the United States by cutting off China’s trade routes in its south and east, respectively, through implementing national embargoes on China and pressuring their smaller neighbors to do the same. Without their cooperation, the United States’ task would become much more difficult.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  The last of the three neighbors—Russia—would be the lynchpin of a successful blockade, and could tip the balance of a blockade in favor of either China or the United States. On the one hand, Russia is remarkably well-positioned to alleviate the blockade’s effects on China. Russian trade would be immune to American interdiction, since Russia’s nuclear arsenal and significant conventional assets preclude any serious American attempts at military coercion. But on the other hand, China’s northern neighbor could also sound the death knell for China’s ability to resist a blockade. On the political level, Moscow continues to exert sway over the decisions made in the capitals of China’s Central Asian neighbors and could convince them to refuse Chinese entreaties to act as transit states. It could also guarantee that China’s two neighboring oil producers would no longer supply it with petroleum.
  
  
  
  
  Accordingly, for the United States to implement a strategically effective blockade of China, it would strive to build a “minimum coalition” with India, Japan, and Russia. If all three states made common cause with the American blockade, then China would be placed in both an economic and a political stranglehold. If not, however, a blockade strategy would regionalize a Sino-American war in a way that would be fundamentally unfavorable to American interests.
  
  
  
  
  Such a minimum coalition could only arise in one way: on the heels of an assertive Chinese push for regional hegemony that precipitates local support for a drastic American response. Short of anything but an aggressive China, collective embargo action will be deterred by the potential consequences of a blockade, not least of which is the possibility of a larger regional conflict with China. The four states are unlikely to coalesce together around an implicit containment policy until each feels that its national interests may be threatened by China in the future.
  
  
  
  
  While such a possibility may appear distant at present, the United States, Japan, India and Russia all fear that Beijing might someday conclude that it must use force in order to protect its interests and to resolve its security dilemma on favorable terms. All four powers have increasingly hedged their bets against this possibility. If China’s power and influence in Asia continues to increase, then the bonds between all four states will strengthen, not out of any conviction about China’s belligerent intentions, but rather because of a profound uncertainty as to their future disposition. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  A Made-in-China Pandemic
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  I believe that China wanted to torpedo the world economy to become the dominant country, read below: It also show in their ruthless actions of burning people near death of covid 19, just to achieve their goals, no matter the obstacles before them. In all the countries around the world where this pandemic exist, the main origin of the virus is from China. 

The COVID-19 pandemic should be a wake-up call for a world that has accepted China’s lengthening shadow over global supply chains for far too long. Only by reducing China’s global economic influence. Now China is spreading lies to deflect world opinion against them.

How China’s fake news machine is rewriting the history of Covid-19, even as the pandemic unfolds

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s retweet of an article blaming the U.S. for infecting Wuhan with coronavirus went viral, viewed 160 million times within hours. But where did the story come from?

A traveler wearing a face mask walks past displays showing flight information at Beijing Capital International Airport in Beijing on March 6, 2020. | Mark Schiefelbein/AP Photo


By now, the early history of Covid-19 is well known, if not clear in its details. The virus was first detected somewhere around Wuhan, in Hubei province, then appears to have entered the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, from where it infected many others. Doctors in Wuhan first noticed the novel coronavirus in December and began exchanging urgent warnings. Local government authorities set out to silence them; some were detained and made to sign documents admitting wrongdoing.


Meanwhile, Wuhan officials went about business as usual, which included a disastrous Lunar New Year banquet attended by about 40,000 families. Soon, many more thousands around Wuhan were infected, with hundreds dead or dying, including ophthalmologist Li Wenliang, who had been punished for trying to raise the alarm. 

Realizing it was in the firing line not just for running the nation that had unleashed the deadly virus on the world but also for ignoring, covering up and denying its spread, China’s Communist Party moved into damage-control mode. This included suggesting it was the United States that was responsible for the virus.

Chinese state media regularly tweet propaganda and what many describe as “fake news”. Global Times has 1.7 million followers on Twitter; China Xinhua News, 12.6 million; People’s Daily, 7.1 million; China Daily, 4.3 million; and China Global Television Network (CGTN), 14 million.

Zhao Lijian, spokesman and deputy director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ information department, had 287,000 followers when he tweeted a link to a conspi­racy website alleging the U.S. was responsible for the virus. (Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying had 146,700 followers; the ministry’s “spokesperson” account, used by Geng Shuang, had 61,000; and Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of Global Times, had 175,000.)

With the outbreak of an epidemic, one of the first jobs of scientists and doctors, even while they fight to save lives, is to identify its source. This is critical in the search for medicines to combat a virus and a vaccine to prevent its spread. 

On January 24, an article written jointly by 29 Chinese medical doctors and scientists was published in The Lancet, one of the world’s leading medical journals. The authors shared their findings from a study of patients who were suspected of having been infected with 2019-nCoV and had been admitted to a Wuhan hospital. The report said that by January 2, 41 of them had been “laboratory-confirmed” as infected with the virus – which causes Covid-19 – and two-thirds of those infected “had been exposed to the Huanan market”.

The findings appeared to support anecdotal evidence that the source of the virus was the market, which had been closed by city officials on January 1. This had been often repeated by Chinese authorities and reported widely in the global media. The Lancet article gave scientific currency to this narrative.

Then, on February 19, another study – this time published on ChinaXiv.org, an open repository and distribution website used by scientific researchers – suggested the market was likely not ground zero for the virus, but rather that it had been “imported”from outside.

The study was by a team of scientists from several institutions: Xishuangbanna Tropical Botanical Garden of Chinese Academy of Sciences; South China Agricultural University; and the Chinese Institute for Brain Research. It was revised on February 21. Neither version of the study suggested Covid-19 had originated outside China.

But the fake news machine was about to go to work.

On February 23, the People’s Daily’s English-language site reprinted a February 22 Global Times article titled, “Japanese TV report sparks speculations in China that Covid-19 may have originated in US”. The original Global Times article, which is no longer available online, began: “A report from a Japanese TV station that suspected some of the 14,000 Americans died of influenza may have unknowningly [sic] contracted the coronavirus has gone viral on Chinese social media, stoking fears and speculations in China that the novel coronavirus may have originated in the U.S. 

“The report, by TV Asahi Corporation of Japan, suggested that the US government may have failed to grasp how rampant the virus have gone [sic] on the US soil.”

The article continued: “The story sparked various conspiracy theories on [sic] Chinese cyberspace.

“The Military World Games were held in Wuhan in October. ‘Perhaps the US delegates brought the coronavirus to Wuhan, and some mutation occurred to the virus, making it more deadly and contagious, and causing a wide­spread outbreak this year,’ a user posted on China’s Twitter-like Weibo.

“[An] international relations professor at the Shanghai-based Fudan University, noted that global virologists are working to track the origin of the virus, including the intel­ligence agencies. Netizens are encouraged to actively par­take in discussions, but preferrably [sic] in a rational fashion.”

The original Global Times article appears to have been replaced with one about the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s denial of the TV Asahi report.

On March 4, the People’s Daily reprint of this article was used as the basis for a piece published on conspiracy website GlobalResearch.ca, titled “China’s Coronavirus: A Shocking Update. Did The Virus Originate in the US?” It was the first of two articles on the website that would lead to Zhao’s tweet nine days later suggesting the U.S. Army had brought the virus to Wuhan.

The March 4 article begins: “The Western media quickly took the stage and laid out the official narrative for the outbreak of the new coronavirus which appeared to have begun in China, claiming it to have originated with animals at a wet market in Wuhan.” 

This omits a few salient facts: that China’s state-controlled media had also “laid out the official narrative”; that reporters had received that narrative from the Chinese government; and that in the early days of the outbreak, the majority of evidence, including the Lancet article by 29 Chinese doctors, pointed to the Wuhan market.

The Global Research article continues: “In fact the origin was for a long time unknown but it appears likely now, according to Chinese and Japanese reports, that the virus originated elsewhere, from multiple locations, but began to spread widely only after being introduced to the market.

“More to the point, it appears that the virus did not originate in China and, according to reports in Japanese and other media, may have originated in the U.S.”

The article then presents a subheading that inflates “may have originated in the US” to “Chinese Researchers Conclude the Virus Originated Outside of China”. Under­neath, it quotes two reports – a February 22 article in Global Times and a February 23 article in CGTN – both about the ChinaXiv study, which did not suggest the virus originated outside China.

But Global Research wanted readers to draw the conclusion that it did, and so it created some dots to be connected: “Chinese medical authorities – and ‘intelligence agencies’ – then conducted a rapid and wide-ranging search for the origin of the virus, collecting nearly 100 samples of the genome from 12 different countries on 4 continents, identifying all the varieties and mutations. During this research, they determined the virus outbreak had begun much earlier, probably in November, shortly after the Wuhan Military Games.

“They then came to the same independent conclusions as the Japanese researchers – that the virus did not begin in China but was introduced there from the outside.” 

That was not the “conclusion” of the scientists who posted their research on ChinaXiv.

Next, citing a February 27 story on Xinhuanet, Global Research invokes a Chinese national hero, Zhong Nanshan, who led the fight to contain severe acute respiratory syn­drome in 2003. “China’s top respiratory specialist Zhong Nanshan said on January 27 … ‘Though the Covid-19 was first discovered in China, it does not mean that it originated from China’.”

Global Research translates this for its readers: “But that is Chinese for ‘it originated someplace else, in another country’.”

Zhong did not say that. Neither did Xinhuanet. And the “Japanese researchers” Global Research refers to are never identified. The only reference to a Japanese source is: “In February of 2020, the Japanese Asahi news report (print and TV) claimed the coronavirus originated in the US, not in China …”

Global Research offers no link to Asahi, only a link to the February 23 People’s Daily article, which also has no Asahi link but was a reprint of the Global Times story, which appears to have been revised on February 22, and – you guessed it – provides no Asahi link.

An online search for “Asahi news coronavirus originated in the US” from February 1 to 29 reveals no link to any such Asahi article. Neither does a search of the Asahi news website, which returns 688 articles containing the word “coronavirus” through March 4. But not this one.

Global Research also cites the Fudan University quote in Global Times: “[The professor] stated that global virologists ‘including the intelligence agencies’ were tracking the origin of the virus. Also of interest, the Chinese government did not shut the door on this. The news report stated: ‘Netizens are encouraged to actively partake in discussions, but prefer­ably in a rational fashion.’ 

“In China, that is meaningful. If the reports were rubbish, the government would clearly state that, and tell people to not spread false rumours.”

The final piece of “evidence” in Global Research’s March 4 article is headed “Taiwan Virologist Suggests the Coronavirus Originated in the US”, and includes an embedded video of a Taiwan television show, identified as This! Is Not News, and a screenshot of a man with a pointer giving a colourful lecture about the origins of the virus. “The man in the video is a top virologist and pharmacologist who performed a long and detailed search for the source of the virus,” claims the article.

Except the man in the video – whom the report does not name – is not a virologist at all. He is a politician from the pro-Beijing New Party and a member of the Taipei City Council, who, before entering politics full time in 2002, was a pharmacology professor.

The clip opens with an introduction from a man in a crew cut, who talks about China and Russia and Georgian defectors carrying American biowarfare secrets, and mosquitoes and bats developed by the U.S. for diabolical purposes. As he talks, tabloid-sized purple characters scroll along the bottom of the screen, punctuated with question marks and exclamation marks, and the one English acronym every conspiracy theorist worldwide knows: “CIA!”

Capping his performance is a 1981 analysis purported to have been carried out by the U.S. Army that showed the attraction of “entomological warfare” to the U.S. military and American taxpayers: 50 per cent of a city of 1.2 million people could be wiped out at a per-corpse cost of 29 cents.

Up next, “the man in the video”notes that, while the man with the crew cut had been talking in terms of Cold War-style geopolitics where everybody fears and loathes everybody else, he is there solely to discuss science. Then he waves a pointer with a plastic yellow index finger at its tip, indicating diagrams of multicoloured circles. As the most complex diagram arrives on screen, he reassures the show’s hostess, “The next slide will make it very clear.” 

Such was Global Research’s Taiwan “expert evidence”. Undaunted, the article continues: “The Taiwanese doctor then stated the virus outbreak began earlier than assumed, saying, ‘We must look to September of 2019’.

“He stated the case in September of 2019 where some Japanese travelled to Hawaii and returned home infected, people who had never been to China. This was two months prior to the infections in China and just after the CDC suddenly and totally shut down the Fort Detrick bio-weapons lab claiming the facilities were insufficient to prevent loss of pathogens.”

The introduction of the U.S. Army’s Fort Detrick bio-weapons lab is a solid piece of conspiracy theory crafts­manship. The “man in the video” had not mentioned Fort Detrick – Global Research did, in an apparent attempt to tie the Taiwanese “virologist’s” Japanese travellers who visited Hawaii in September to a U.S. Army bioweapons lab.

The Fort Detrick facility had not been “suddenly and totally shut down” – it ceased research in mid-July (and not in September). And how one of the most contagious viruses in history travelled from Maryland to Hawaii over a six- to eight-week period, leaving no trail of illness and death, goes unexamined by Global Research.

For good measure, the article closes by listing six outbreaks in 2018, 2019 and 2020 of “pandemics” that “sickened” and “killed” people, chickens and pigs in China. Each includes notes such as, “China needs to purchase U.S. agricultural products,” suggesting that as part of the trade war, the U.S. has been unleashing pathogens in the mainland for more than two years in order to make China buy American.

In summary, the March 4 article invokes mainland hero Zhong, the “Japanese” and the “Taiwanese” – two American allies with no reason to lie – and adds the “CIA” and a leaky U.S. bioweapons research lab for spice. All independent and none really confirming the others while appearing to come close. Perhaps most impressive of all, the author produced almost 2,000 America-bashing words, and not one of them was “Trump”. 

On March 5, without citing the Global Research March 4 piece or any of the underlying Chinese media articles, Zhao tweeted: “Confirmed cases of #COVID19 were first found in China, but its origin is not necessarily in China. We are still tracing the origin.”

On March 11, Global Research published a follow-up: “COVID-19: Further Evidence that the Virus Originated in the US”.

The story begins by recapping the March 4 article, upgrading the never-found Japanese Asahi broadcasters and the “man in the video” to “Japanese and Taiwanese epidemiologists and pharmacologists [who] have deter­mined that the new coronavirus could have originated in the US”. The “man in the video” was now also a “physician” and a “scientist”.

Recalling his attempt to place the first Covid-19 case in the U.S., Global Research again points out, “immediately prior to that, the CDC totally shut down the U.S. Military’s main bio-lab at Fort Detrick, Maryland, due to an absence of safeguards against pathogen leakages, issuing a complete ‘cease and desist’ order to the military”.

As evidence, Global Research had posted a screenshot of an August 5 New York Times headline, “Deadly Germ Research Is Shut Down at Army Lab Over Safety Concerns; Problems with disposal of dangerous materials led the government to suspend research at the military’s leading biodefence centre”.

In fact, the New York Times article had not stated the centre had been “totally shut down”. It had reported that 900 people worked at the facility and, “Although many projects are on hold, [a facility spokeswoman] said scien­tists and other employees are continuing to work, just not on select agents”. Both The New York Times and a local newspaper that first reported the cessation of the research noted that no pathogens had escaped the facility. 

Global Research’s March 11 story continues: “We also had the Japanese citizens infected in September of 2019, in Hawaii, people who had never been to China, these infec­tions occurring on US soil long before the outbreak in Wuhan but only shortly after the locking down of Fort Detrick.

“Then, on Chinese social media, another article appeared, aware of the above but presenting further details. It stated in part that five ‘foreign’ athletes or other personnel visiting Wuhan for the World Military Games (October 18-27, 2019) were hospitalised in Wuhan for an undetermined infection.”

That other article is a blog on Chinese social media, identified only by a QR code, that began: “Because there have been so many American dogs recently, in consider­ation for my account’s safety, [I must write] ‘some country’ or ‘M Country’ [when referring to America].”

The blog entry, which appeared to be a work in progress and is no longer online, recycled much of Global Research’s March 4 article, adding screenshots of local news stories about U.S. military personnel in Wuhan for the October military games who were hospitalized.

According to Global Research: “The article explains more clearly that the Wuhan version of the virus could have come only from the US because it is what they call a ‘branch’ which could not have been created first because it would have no ‘seed’. It would have to have been a new variety spun off the original ‘trunk’, and that trunk exists only in the US.”

So there it was. A post on “Chinese social media” about “‘foreign’ athletes or other personnel visiting Wuhan for the World Military Games” in October completed the conspiracy’s journey. The fake news world had rewritten the origin of Covid-19: it was not due to a catastrophic natural occurrence somewhere in or around Wuhan, as the world’s scientists believed, but to a bio­weapon brought to Wuhan by the U.S. Army. 

At the end of its March 11 article, Global Research returned to January, citing two articles in Science magazine for further “evidence” of its conspiracy – neither of which states the origin of the virus was, as Global Research puts it, “Not in Wuhan” – tying a bow around the package Zhao would soon forward to hundreds of thousands, who would forward it to hundreds of millions.

On the morning of March 13, Zhao tweeted links to the Global Research articles: “This article is very much important to each and every one of us. Please read and retweet it. COVID-19: Further Evidence that the Virus Originated in the US. It would be useful to read this prior article for background: China’s Coronavirus: A Shocking Update. Did The Virus …”

Followed by: “Just take a few minutes to read one more article. This is so astonishing that it changed many things I used to believe in. Please retweet to let more people know about it. China’s Coronavirus: A Shocking Update. Did The Virus Originate in the US? – Global Research: The Western media quickly laid out the official narrative for the outbreak of COVID-19 which appeared to have begun in China …”

By late afternoon, the South China Morning Post reported that the hashtag topic “Zhao Lijian sent out five consecutive tweets questioning the US” had been viewed more than 4.7 million times on Weibo. Twelve hours later, The New York Times reported it had been viewed more than 160 million times.

Zhao’s Twitter followers have increased from 287,000 to more than 500,000. Media worldwide carried stories about his tweets, putting them in front of millions more readers, most of whom would never have seen them on Twitter or Weibo. Fake virus news had gone viral.

In October, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence noted in the first line of its report on Russia’s use of social media to meddle in the 2016 presidential election, that “information warfare [is] designed to spread disinformation and societal division”. Zhao’s tweets accomplished both. The disinformation was obvious. Critical thinking in abeyance, plenty of people will believe a claim that the U.S. Army planted Covid-19 in Wuhan; even more will want it to be true.

When President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and others began fighting back by loudly and repeatedly calling Covid-19 “the Chinese virus”, social division in the U.S. grew, if that is possible. The media accused Trump of being racist and xenophobic, and inciting more of the same towards Chinese-Americans. This only caused Trump to say it louder and more often.

One wonders how much longer Washington will conti­nue fighting the information war against Beijing with one arm tied behind its back. Chinese media enjoy free run of the U.S., including on Twitter. The U.S. has no such freedom in China.

Not a few pundits in these past few weeks have predicted Covid-19 will end globalisation, or even “life as we know it”. That seems unlikely, given the short-term nature of people’s memories and how profitable “life as we know it” has been for so many. But given the mischief Zhao’s tweets caused, Beijing’s days on Twitter might be numbered.

NEW DELHI – The new COVID-19 coronavirus has spread to more than 100 countries – bringing social disruption, economic damage, sickness, and death – largely because authorities in China, where it emerged, initially suppressed information about it. And yet China is now acting as if its decision not to limit exports of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and medical supplies – of which it is the dominant global supplier – was a principled and generous act worthy of the world’s gratitude.

Witnessing Wuhan

When the first clinical evidence of a deadly new virus emerged in Wuhan, Chinese authorities failed to warn the public for weeks and harassed, reprimanded, and detained those who did. This approach is no surprise: China has a long history of “killing” the messenger. Its leaders covered up severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), another coronavirus, for over a month after it emerged in 2002, and held the doctor who blew the whistle in military custody for 45 days. SARS ultimately affected

more than 8,000 people in 26 countries.

This time around, the Communist Party of China’s proclivity for secrecy was reinforced by President Xi Jinping’s eagerness to be perceived as an in-control strongman, backed by a fortified CPC. But, as with the SARS epidemic, China’s leaders could keep it under wraps for only so long. Once Wuhan-linked COVID-19 cases were detected in Thailand and South Korea

, they had little choice but to acknowledge the epidemic. 

About two weeks after Xi rejected scientists’ recommendation to declare a state of emergency, the government announced heavy-handed containment measures, including putting millions on lockdown. But it was too late: many thousands of Chinese were already infected with COVID-19, and the virus was rapidly spreading internationally. US National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien has said

that China’s initial cover-up “probably cost the world community two months to respond,” exacerbating the global outbreak. 

Beyond the escalating global health emergency, which has already killed thousands

, the pandemic has disrupted normal trade and travel, forced many school closures, roiled the international financial system, and sunk global stock markets. With oil prices plunging, a global recession appears imminent. 

None of this would have happened had China responded quickly to evidence of the deadly new virus by warning the public and implementing containment measures. Indeed, Taiwan and Vietnam have shown the difference a proactive response can make.1 

Taiwan, learning from its experience with SARS, instituted

preventive measures, including flight inspections, before China’s leaders had even acknowledged the outbreak. Likewise, Vietnam quickly halted flights from China and closed all schools. Both responses recognized the need for transparency, including updates on the number and location of infections and public advisories on how to guard against COVID-19. 

Thanks to their governments’ policies, both Taiwan and Vietnam – which normally receive huge numbers of travelers from China daily – have kept total cases under 50. Neighbors that were slower to implement similar measures, such as Japan and South Korea, have been hit much harder. 

If any other country had triggered such a far-reaching, deadly, and above all preventable crisis, it would now be a global pariah. But China, with its tremendous economic clout, has largely escaped censure. Nonetheless, it will take considerable effort for Xi’s regime to restore its standing at home and abroad. 

Perhaps that is why China’s leaders are publicly congratulating themselves for not limiting exports of medical supplies and APIs used to make medicines, vitamins, and vaccines. If China decided to ban such exports to the United States, the state-run news agency Xinhua recently noted

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the costs of Xi’s increasing authoritarianism. It should be a wake-up call for political and business leaders who have accepted China’s lengthening shadow over global supply chains for far too long. Only by loosening China’s grip on global supply networks – beginning with the pharmaceutical sector – can the world be kept safe from the country’s political pathologies. 

The story of Palau and its place in US military strategy An archipelago of just 21,000 inhabitants, Palau has come to have a special place in the strategic plans of the world’s largest economy. We find out why the US places such importance on continued cooperation. “Palau is indispensable to our national security,” claimed the US Department of Defense in its 2018 budget request, describing the need for America to meet its funding commitments to this small Pacific state as ‘key to our strategic presence in the region’. That would be a huge accolade for any nation, but for one with a total landmass amounting to just 180 square miles, spread over a chain of some 340 islands, roughly 500 miles south east of the Philippines; it is nothing short of remarkable. The United States’ involvement with these islands dates back to the ‘Operation Forager’ campaign of June to November 1944, which ultimately saw US forces take Palau from the Japanese after a bloody and protracted two-and-a-half months of fighting at the Battle of Peleliu. After the Second World War, Palau, which had been placed under Japanese control by the League of Nations at the end of WWI, was then put under US administration by the United Nations as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). The original 1947 trusteeship agreement designated the TTPI a “strategic area” and until 1951, it was controlled by the US Navy from Guam, after which time the US Department of the Interior took over from a base in Saipan. Compact renewal Subsequently, moves towards Palauan independence began in 1978, with Palau finally becoming a sovereign state in 1994. Before that happened, however, the country joined with its TTPI fellows, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), signing a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the USA in 1982. Under the terms of the COFA, the US provides a package of financial assistance which is administered via the Office of Insular Affairs, and assumes responsibility for national defence and security, in return for the exclusive freedom to operate and base American armed forces across the COFA territory. The arrangement was intended to hold sway for 50 years, with a series of phased reviews and renewals along the way. However, while the compacts with the FSM and RMI were renewed for 20 years in 2003, and despite the successful conclusion of the Compact Renewal Agreement (CRA) talks for Palau in late 2010, there has been much foot-dragging around implementing it.As late as the end of June this year, the US House Armed Services Committee was still refusing to allow the funds to be transferred .” As late as the end of June this year, the US House Armed Services Committee was still refusing to allow the funds to be transferred from the Pentagon to the Interior Department, apparently citing reasons of ‘Congressional oversight’. For an island chain that few could find readily on a map, and for a sum of $123.9m over seven years – scarcely a drop in the ocean of US military spending – the argument in favour of renewal has drawn some pretty heavy-weight supporters, including the Head of the US Pacific Command, Senator John McCain and even the President himself. The reasons are clear; as the Whitehouse warned in its Statement of Administration Policy on the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), failing to approve the CRA risks the US losing “access and influence in a region that is increasingly contested by China.” Strategic posture Nearly 75 years on from the Pacific campaigns of WWII, Palau remains as strategically important as ever, commanding the approaches to Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, and flanking a number of other islands and archipelagos. Having exclusive military access to such a critically located swathe of real estate provides the US with what Admiral Harry Harris, Head of Pacific Command, has described as ‘a measurable advantage in our strategic posture in the Western Pacific’. Perhaps more to the point, it is one which Beijing would, unquestionably, be only too ready to gain for itself, should the opportunity arise. Given China’s ongoing policy of expanding its sphere of influence in an attempt to become the preeminent power in the region, a move towards Palau would be a very real possibility if the COFA renewal fails to materialise. For more than a decade, Beijing has been quietly encouraging the small Pacific nations, and most notably Fiji, to adopt a ‘look north’ approach and increasingly engage with Asia through China, backed up with the lure of enhanced Chinese economic and military co-operation. If the US really were to leave Palau with a funding vacuum, then it is hard to imagine that a suitably attractive offer denominated in yuan would not be forthcoming if it meant that Beijing could finally prise the island chain away from American control. Future of the CRA Exactly how large a hole that might leave in US military preparedness in the Asia-Pacific is hard to gauge, as very little detail is forthcoming about the precise nature of the role that Palau plays in it, beyond its very obvious strategic geography. There are very few clues to be gleaned from the terms of the COFA itself, beyond the prohibition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from the islands and the eligibility of Palauan citizens to serve in the US armed forces. Apart from the occasionally publicised war games, such as the Embassy evacuation exercise in August 2015, the rest of whatever it is that the US does here appears to be too sensitive to make public. It seems a case of ‘what happens in Palau, stays in Palau’ and perhaps that in itself should speak volumes about the probable future of the CRA. “It seems a case of ‘what happens in Palau, stays in Palau’ and perhaps that in itself should speak volumes about the probable future of the CRA.” That future is likely to be decided in the months ahead, as the 2018 NDAA moves through the House-Senate conference committee stage and Congress members look to resolve the differences of position between the two chambers. Senator John McCain’s Senate Armed Service Committee has already included approval of the CRA in its version of the Act, paving the way for the Conference committee to merge the upper and lower chambers’ proposals, and finally allow the Palau Compact to be renewed and funded. The Senate Armed Service Committee’s argument is widely expected to prevail during the forthcoming conference discussions. While there is some understanding of the House of Representatives’ reticence over transferring budget funds from one department to another, few Washington commentators believe that this will trump the potential loss of prime operational geography, or the diminution of prestige and influence it would inevitably entail. As military spending goes, $17.7m a year will not buy very much – perhaps a new MQ-9 Reaper drone and some change to run it, or a 10% share in an F-35. Conversely of course, it could be used to buy another year’s exclusive access to some of the most strategically important islands in the Pacific. It is very hard to see the US walking away from that sort of bargain. The U.S. should look to establish hub and spoke base networks in the Marianas Islands, Palau, and eventually the Philippines. A 69th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron B-52 Stratofortress prepares to taxi down the flightline on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Oct. 22, 2019. the Pacific, but provided few details regarding exact locations or operating concepts. Given the security situation in the Pacific, the U.S. should look to establish hub and spoke base networks in the Marianas Islands, Palau, and eventually the Philippines. Furthermore, operating concepts for the hub and spoke base networks should aim to enhance resiliency, frustrate Chinese targeting, and further the United States’ geostrategic position.Esper’s call for additional basing is necessary based on U.S. interests, lack of current basing options, and China’s assertiveness. The recent Chinese Defense White Paper highlights China’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric, which is matched by actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and around Taiwan. These actions threaten American interests in the region, including freedom of navigation and the military geography of the U.S. position in the Pacific. Ultimately, U.S and allied military power in the region is the guarantor of the fair trade upon which the United States depends. Unfortunately, the United States has limited air bases in the region from which to project power. On the Asian mainland, the United States has only two air bases in South Korea, both of which are focused on preparing for and deterring war with North Korea. Beyond the mainland, the United States maintains air bases in Japan, but only Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is positioned to secure U.S. interests in the East China Sea (ECS) or SCS. The United States also maintains a base on Guam; however, the concentration of forces there make it a prime target for enemy operations. To help safeguard U.S. interests and to check China, the United States needs to establish a more robust base network in the region.The United States should develop an integrated base network using a hub and spoke model. A hub and spoke base network includes a main operating base (MOB) and collocated operating bases (COBs). This is not a new idea; the U.S. Air Force used a similar model to ensure survivability during the Cold War. The Cold War model was designed for continental use but could be adapted to the Pacific. In the original model, the MOB, or hub, was where the Air Force had forces permanently stationed. The spokes — COBs — were bare bones facilities. During peacetime the majority of forces would be based at the hubs; however, indications of war would trigger dispersal to the spokes. A 1986 RAND report identifies the required and desired facilities for COBs, summarized in Table 1.Additionally, the MOB/hub, should include significant logistics capabilities including a port, or excellent over-land connection to a port, to enable sustainment. The spokes/COBs should be bare-bones facilities which can be sustained via air or more limited surface transportation. Additionally, hubs and spokes should be mutually supporting both in terms of defensive capabilities and in their ability to handle aircraft. In terms of ability to handle aircraft, for bases to support fighters they need 8,000 feet of useable runway, while bombers and key elements U.S. ISR capabilities require 10,000 feet of runway. Finally, this model can help balance tradeoffs in other areas like security. For example, a hub could be in a more populated area to ease logistics and personnel requirements, while the bulk of the combat power might be dispersed to more remote spokes.Given the increasing range of conventional fires, it’s unlikely that U.S. bases in the Pacific will be able to exist outside the effective range of PRC fires. That being said, hubs and spokes would complicate China’s ability to target U.S. bases. It would force the PLA to monitor more locations and to divide their forces between multiple locations. Placing the bases outside the range of the majority of PRC fires assets would further force them to divide their limited number of long-range ISR and fires assets. The most recent Department of Defense estimate provided to Congress states that the PRC has 570 ground-based launchers for short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, ICBM). However, only 80 of those, the DF-26 IRBM, would be used to target Guam, the other Marianas Islands or Palau. The remainder of the PRC’s missiles either can’t reach those targets (i.e. SRBMs and MRBMs), or are nuclear forces (i.e. ICBMs) and would be reserved for nuclear attacks (which brings up scenarios that are outside the scope of this piece). The Philippines have locations, including Clark and Subic Bay in Northern Luzon, that are within the range of some of China’s SRBMs and other areas that China could only reach with IRBMs.The Philippines appear to offer the ideal location for U.S. bases, but it is currently politically unfeasible given President Rodrigo Duterte’s eagerness to partner with China instead of the United States. That being said, the U.S. should eye the Philippines for basing options after 2022, when the Philippines should inaugurate a new president. The Philippines has a number of excellent ports including Subic Bay, which has been a hub for U.S. operations in the past. In addition to Subic, Clark Air Base has supported U.S. air operations in the past. Beyond Clark, the Philippines has a network of established airbases that the U.S. could potentially use to enhance resiliency and complicate Chinese targeting.However, there are some important issues associated with potential basing in the Philippines. First, the island of Luzon’s proximity to key areas – the SCS and Taiwan – is both a blessing and a curse. Luzon’s geographic location is a blessing because it means that it would be easier for aircraft to get to the potential fight, but also a curse because airbases there would be vulnerable to a greater number of Chinese ballistic missiles. Similarly, there may be a measure of security for U.S. forces operating from Luzon; the PRC may be hesitant to widen a conflict in the SCS or with Taiwan by drawing in the Philippines. However, such diplomacy is a double-edged sword; the Philippines, in an effort to avoid being drawn into a conflict with China, may prohibit the U.S. from launching combat or support missions from airbases in the Philippines similar to what Turkey did during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.Moving east from the Philippines is Palau, which has three options for U.S. bases: Koror, Peleliu, and Angaur. Koror has a port and a functioning airfield. Its airfield has a 7,200-foot runway, which makes it suitable for transport aircraft but limits its utility for fighters. Additionally, extending Koror’s airfield would require construction on the one runway servicing the islands, which would interrupt commercial traffic. Koror’s airfield has security challenges as well. It is a civil airfield and the island is a scuba diving hotspot — so it has a slew of resorts. Koror would, however, be potentially suitable as a hub for operations originating in Palau.South of Koror are Peleliu and Angaur Islands. Peleliu has a 6,000-foot long, 40-foot wide runway that is overgrown and currently unusable. Angaur’s runway, at 7,000-feet by 150-feet, is closer in size to what would be required for combat operations. Adding 1,000 to 2,000-feet to support fighter operations, or up to 4,000-feet to support bomber and ISR operations to these runways is possible, even if it requires operations to extend them into what is now the sea. Developing Peleliu and Angaur should be politically feasible given recent statements by Palau’s president requesting modernization of these airfields. Additionally, there should be some ability to engage in burden sharing with Palau, including options to use Palau’s police force as security for U.S. forces. Peleliu and Angaur are far less visited than Koror, making them easier to secure and thus more suitable for military operations. Both islands have limited facilities, but the United States could use Koror for personnel and administrative functions while establishing bare-bones facilities at Peleliu or Angaur. U.S. forces in Palau would lack mutual support with those operating in Guam or the Marianas, but they would also force even greater complexity on Chinese targeting. That being said, if the United States were to establish multiple bases in Palau, those bases would enjoy mutual support with one another.The U.S. should also develop airfields on its own territory in the Marianas including those on Guam, Saipan and Tinian. Guam has an excellent port, a naval base and a major Air Force Base. Andersen AFB would be an excellent hub, but right now it is without spokes. Potential spokes include airfields on Guam or in the Northern Marianas Islands.Orote Field, located on the Navy Base Guam, has a 4,000-foot defunct runway, which could be lengthened and improved. Additionally, being on a navy base gives Orote a measure of security and logistical supportability. However, Orote is limited in its ability to complicate the PRC’s targeting, since Guam is already a likely point of interest for the PRC.The Northern Marianas Islands (NMI) have two international airports. Tinian and Saipan both have functioning runways exceeding 8,000-feet and are between 120 and 140-miles respectively from Andersen AFB. Both islands also have defunct airfields that could be returned to service to provide a more secure location for military operations, though at higher cost than converting the international airports to dual use facilities. Tinian and Saipan could serve as spokes for the Guamanian hub, and forces in NMI would share a measure of mutual support with forces on Guam. Aircraft based at Guam could reasonably use NMI fields as divert fields. Additionally, Patriot Missile sites on Tinian or Saipan would likely overlap in coverage with those on Guam, forcing China to target multiple mutually supporting bases.Of course, just because the United States can develop bases in the Philippines, Palau, or Marianas, doesn’t mean it should. Furthermore, additional bases should not just complicate Chinese targeting but they should also improve the United States’ geostrategic position and provide the U.S. with strategic options. Developing additional bases in Palau, the Marianas and eventually the Philippines will help the U.S. ensure the survivability of combat power in the Philippine Sea, enable force projection from the Philippine Sea, and provide multiple lines of operation converging on strategic terrain. Fighter aircraft operating from Palau or the Marianas will be operating at extreme ranges to directly support U.S. operations in support of Taiwan, the SCS or ECS. However, aircraft from Palau or the Marianas could support Navy assets operating in and from the Philippine Sea. For example, USAF fighters could provide fleet defense for a carrier-based force operating in the Philippine Sea, which would free up carrier-based fighters for offensive missions. In some respects this is similar to the concept developed in World War II of having multiple carriers operating together with one as the duty carrier and the other as a strike carrier. Of course, aircraft with longer ranges would be able to carry out independent missions as well.Bases in Palau and the Marianas would allow the United States to ensure secure lines of communication from the Philippine Sea to key American interests in Taiwan and Okinawa. Additionally, in the event that the Philippines strengthen ties with the PRC, bases in Palau can serve to defend America’s western flank including the lines of communication between the Marianas and Okinawa and Taiwan. If the Philippines returns to the American camp, bases in Palau can help ensure lines of communication to the Philippines. With secure lines of communication, the U.S. could establish base networks in the Philippines to project power into the SCS and toward Taiwan and can look to establish additional basing options around the SCS. US and Philippines said to be in talks on rocket system to deter Beijing’s ‘militarisation’ in South China SeaSecurity experts say the two sides have been unable to reach a deal because the American system could be too expensive for Manila Chinese man-made islands on reefs in the disputed Spratly chain would be in striking distance if it’s deployed, according to one analysis An influential defence think tank has urged the US to deploy the high-mobility artillery rocket system in Southeast Asian countries. Washington and Manila have been discussing the potential deployment of an upgraded US rocket system in a bid to deter Beijing’s “militarisation” of its artificial islands in the contested South China Sea, according to regional security experts. But the two sides have been unable to reach a deal because the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) could be too expensive for Manila given its tight defence budget, they said. The allies’ defence chiefs, however, reaffirmed their “enduring alliance” on Monday in Washington, and agreed to increase the interoperability of their forces and US support for the modernisation of the Philippines’ armed forces. The latest reaffirmation echoed US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s mutual defence reassurance in Manila last month, when Pompeo singled out the threat of “China’s island-building and military activities” in the disputed waterway. If deployed, the long-range, precision-guided rockets fired by the system would be able to strike Chinese man-made islands on reefs in the Spratly chain, one expert said. The revelation came after an influential defence think tank, the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, warned in a new report that the US’ “freedom of navigation” operations had failed to fundamentally alter Beijing’s course in the South China Sea. Beijing has reportedly installed anti-ship and surface-to-air missile systems on three artificial islands on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief reefs in the Spratly chain, posing a potential hurdle to US military access in the contested area. It rejected a US demand that the missiles be removed during high-level diplomatic and security talks in Washington in November. ‘Time for tougher deterrence from China’ as US steps up patrols in South China Sea 29 Mar 2019 The think tank’s report released on March 21 urged the US to deploy HIMARS in Southeast Asian countries, which will “demonstrate the flexibility and variability of America’s rotational military presence”.

The story of Palau and its place in US military strategy

An archipelago of just 21,000 inhabitants, Palau has come to have a special place in the strategic plans of the world’s largest economy. We find out why the US places such importance on continued cooperation.

“Palau is indispensable to our national security,” claimed the US Department of Defense in its 2018 budget request, describing the need for America to meet its funding commitments to this small Pacific state as ‘key to our strategic presence in the region’.

That would be a huge accolade for any nation, but for one with a total landmass amounting to just 180 square miles, spread over a chain of some 340 islands, roughly 500 miles south east of the Philippines; it is nothing short of remarkable.

The United States’ involvement with these islands dates back to the ‘Operation Forager’ campaign of June to November 1944, which ultimately saw US forces take Palau from the Japanese after a bloody and protracted two-and-a-half months of fighting at the Battle of Peleliu. After the Second World War, Palau, which had been placed under Japanese control by the League of Nations at the end of WWI, was then put under US administration by the United Nations as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).

The original 1947 trusteeship agreement designated the TTPI a “strategic area” and until 1951, it was controlled by the US Navy from Guam, after which time the US Department of the Interior took over from a base in Saipan.

Compact renewal

Subsequently, moves towards Palauan independence began in 1978, with Palau finally becoming a sovereign state in 1994. Before that happened, however, the country joined with its TTPI fellows, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), signing a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the USA in 1982.

Under the terms of the COFA, the US provides a package of financial assistance which is administered via the Office of Insular Affairs, and assumes responsibility for national defence and security, in return for the exclusive freedom to operate and base American armed forces across the COFA territory.

The arrangement was intended to hold sway for 50 years, with a series of phased reviews and renewals along the way. However, while the compacts with the FSM and RMI were renewed for 20 years in 2003, and despite the successful conclusion of the Compact Renewal Agreement (CRA) talks for Palau in late 2010, there has been much foot-dragging around implementing it.As late as the end of June this year, the US House Armed Services Committee was still refusing to allow the funds to be transferred .”

As late as the end of June this year, the US House Armed Services Committee was still refusing to allow the funds to be transferred from the Pentagon to the Interior Department, apparently citing reasons of ‘Congressional oversight’.

For an island chain that few could find readily on a map, and for a sum of $123.9m over seven years – scarcely a drop in the ocean of US military spending – the argument in favour of renewal has drawn some pretty heavy-weight supporters, including the Head of the US Pacific Command, Senator John McCain and even the President himself. The reasons are clear; as the Whitehouse warned in its Statement of Administration Policy on the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), failing to approve the CRA risks the US losing “access and influence in a region that is increasingly contested by China.”

Strategic posture

Nearly 75 years on from the Pacific campaigns of WWII, Palau remains as strategically important as ever, commanding the approaches to Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, and flanking a number of other islands and archipelagos. Having exclusive military access to such a critically located swathe of real estate provides the US with what Admiral Harry Harris, Head of Pacific Command, has described as ‘a measurable advantage in our strategic posture in the Western Pacific’.

Perhaps more to the point, it is one which Beijing would, unquestionably, be only too ready to gain for itself, should the opportunity arise. Given China’s ongoing policy of expanding its sphere of influence in an attempt to become the preeminent power in the region, a move towards Palau would be a very real possibility if the COFA renewal fails to materialise.

For more than a decade, Beijing has been quietly encouraging the small Pacific nations, and most notably Fiji, to adopt a ‘look north’ approach and increasingly engage with Asia through China, backed up with the lure of enhanced Chinese economic and military co-operation. If the US really were to leave Palau with a funding vacuum, then it is hard to imagine that a suitably attractive offer denominated in yuan would not be forthcoming if it meant that Beijing could finally prise the island chain away from American control.

Future of the CRA

Exactly how large a hole that might leave in US military preparedness in the Asia-Pacific is hard to gauge, as very little detail is forthcoming about the precise nature of the role that Palau plays in it, beyond its very obvious strategic geography. There are very few clues to be gleaned from the terms of the COFA itself, beyond the prohibition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from the islands and the eligibility of Palauan citizens to serve in the US armed forces.

Apart from the occasionally publicised war games, such as the Embassy evacuation exercise in August 2015, the rest of whatever it is that the US does here appears to be too sensitive to make public. It seems a case of ‘what happens in Palau, stays in Palau’ and perhaps that in itself should speak volumes about the probable future of the CRA.

“It seems a case of ‘what happens in Palau, stays in Palau’ and perhaps that in itself should speak volumes about the probable future of the CRA.”

That future is likely to be decided in the months ahead, as the 2018 NDAA moves through the House-Senate conference committee stage and Congress members look to resolve the differences of position between the two chambers. Senator John McCain’s Senate Armed Service Committee has already included approval of the CRA in its version of the Act, paving the way for the Conference committee to merge the upper and lower chambers’ proposals, and finally allow the Palau Compact to be renewed and funded.

The Senate Armed Service Committee’s argument is widely expected to prevail during the forthcoming conference discussions. While there is some understanding of the House of Representatives’ reticence over transferring budget funds from one department to another, few Washington commentators believe that this will trump the potential loss of prime operational geography, or the diminution of prestige and influence it would inevitably entail.

As military spending goes, $17.7m a year will not buy very much – perhaps a new MQ-9 Reaper drone and some change to run it, or a 10% share in an F-35. Conversely of course, it could be used to buy another year’s exclusive access to some of the most strategically important islands in the Pacific. It is very hard to see the US walking away from that sort of bargain.

The U.S. should look to establish hub and spoke base networks in the Marianas Islands, Palau, and eventually the Philippines. 

A 69th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron B-52 Stratofortress prepares to taxi down the flightline on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Oct. 22, 2019.

the Pacific, but provided few details regarding exact locations or operating concepts. Given the security situation in the Pacific, the U.S. should look to establish hub and spoke base networks in the Marianas Islands, Palau, and eventually the Philippines. Furthermore, operating concepts for the hub and spoke base networks should aim to enhance resiliency, frustrate Chinese targeting, and further the United States’ geostrategic position.

Esper’s call for additional basing is necessary based on U.S. interests, lack of current basing options, and China’s assertiveness. The recent Chinese Defense White Paper highlights China’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric, which is matched by actions in the South China Sea (SCS) and around Taiwan. These actions threaten American interests in the region, including freedom of navigation and the military geography of the U.S. position in the Pacific. Ultimately, U.S and allied military power in the region is the guarantor of the fair trade upon which the United States depends. Unfortunately, the United States has limited air bases in the region from which to project power. On the Asian mainland, the United States has only two air bases in South Korea, both of which are focused on preparing for and deterring war with North Korea. Beyond the mainland, the United States maintains air bases in Japan, but only Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is positioned to secure U.S. interests in the East China Sea (ECS) or SCS. The United States also maintains a base on Guam; however, the concentration of forces there make it a prime target for enemy operations. To help safeguard U.S. interests and to check China, the United States needs to establish a more robust base network in the region.

The United States should develop an integrated base network using a hub and spoke model. A hub and spoke base network includes a main operating base (MOB) and collocated operating bases (COBs). This is not a new idea; the U.S. Air Force used a similar model to ensure survivability during the Cold War. The Cold War model was designed for continental use but could be adapted to the Pacific. In the original model, the MOB, or hub, was where the Air Force had forces permanently stationed. The spokes — COBs — were bare bones facilities. During peacetime the majority of forces would be based at the hubs; however, indications of war would trigger dispersal to the spokes. A 1986 RAND report identifies the required and desired facilities for COBs, summarized in Table 1.




Additionally, the MOB/hub, should include significant logistics capabilities including a port, or excellent over-land connection to a port, to enable sustainment. The spokes/COBs should be bare-bones facilities which can be sustained via air or more limited surface transportation. Additionally, hubs and spokes should be mutually supporting both in terms of defensive capabilities and in their ability to handle aircraft. In terms of ability to handle aircraft, for bases to support fighters they need 8,000 feet of useable runway, while bombers and key elements U.S. ISR capabilities require 10,000 feet of runway. Finally, this model can help balance tradeoffs in other areas like security. For example, a hub could be in a more populated area to ease logistics and personnel requirements, while the bulk of the combat power might be dispersed to more remote spokes.




Given the increasing range of conventional fires, it’s unlikely that U.S. bases in the Pacific will be able to exist outside the effective range of PRC fires. That being said, hubs and spokes would complicate China’s ability to target U.S. bases. It would force the PLA to monitor more locations and to divide their forces between multiple locations. Placing the bases outside the range of the majority of PRC fires assets would further force them to divide their limited number of long-range ISR and fires assets. The most recent Department of Defense estimate provided to Congress states that the PRC has 570 ground-based launchers for short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, ICBM). However, only 80 of those, the DF-26 IRBM, would be used to target Guam, the other Marianas Islands or Palau. The remainder of the PRC’s missiles either can’t reach those targets (i.e. SRBMs and MRBMs), or are nuclear forces (i.e. ICBMs) and would be reserved for nuclear attacks (which brings up scenarios that are outside the scope of this piece). The Philippines have locations, including Clark and Subic Bay in Northern Luzon, that are within the range of some of China’s SRBMs and other areas that China could only reach with IRBMs.

The Philippines appear to offer the ideal location for U.S. bases, but it is currently politically unfeasible given President Rodrigo Duterte’s eagerness to partner with China instead of the United States. That being said, the U.S. should eye the Philippines for basing options after 2022, when the Philippines should inaugurate a new president. The Philippines has a number of excellent ports including Subic Bay, which has been a hub for U.S. operations in the past. In addition to Subic, Clark Air Base has supported U.S. air operations in the past. Beyond Clark, the Philippines has a network of established airbases that the U.S. could potentially use to enhance resiliency and complicate Chinese targeting.

However, there are some important issues associated with potential basing in the Philippines. First, the island of Luzon’s proximity to key areas – the SCS and Taiwan – is both a blessing and a curse. Luzon’s geographic location is a blessing because it means that it would be easier for aircraft to get to the potential fight, but also a curse because airbases there would be vulnerable to a greater number of Chinese ballistic missiles. Similarly, there may be a measure of security for U.S. forces operating from Luzon; the PRC may be hesitant to widen a conflict in the SCS or with Taiwan by drawing in the Philippines. However, such diplomacy is a double-edged sword; the Philippines, in an effort to avoid being drawn into a conflict with China, may prohibit the U.S. from launching combat or support missions from airbases in the Philippines similar to what Turkey did during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.Moving east from the Philippines is Palau, which has three options for U.S. bases: Koror, Peleliu, and Angaur. Koror has a port and a functioning airfield. Its airfield has a 7,200-foot runway, which makes it suitable for transport aircraft but limits its utility for fighters. Additionally, extending Koror’s airfield would require construction on the one runway servicing the islands, which would interrupt commercial traffic. Koror’s airfield has security challenges as well. It is a civil airfield and the island is a scuba diving hotspot — so it has a slew of resorts. Koror would, however, be potentially suitable as a hub for operations originating in Palau.

South of Koror are Peleliu and Angaur Islands. Peleliu has a 6,000-foot long, 40-foot wide runway that is overgrown and currently unusable. Angaur’s runway, at 7,000-feet by 150-feet, is closer in size to what would be required for combat operations. Adding 1,000 to 2,000-feet to support fighter operations, or up to 4,000-feet to support bomber and ISR operations to these runways is possible, even if it requires operations to extend them into what is now the sea. Developing Peleliu and Angaur should be politically feasible given recent statements by Palau’s president requesting modernization of these airfields. Additionally, there should be some ability to engage in burden sharing with Palau, including options to use Palau’s police force as security for U.S. forces. Peleliu and Angaur are far less visited than Koror, making them easier to secure and thus more suitable for military operations. Both islands have limited facilities, but the United States could use Koror for personnel and administrative functions while establishing bare-bones facilities at Peleliu or Angaur. U.S. forces in Palau would lack mutual support with those operating in Guam or the Marianas, but they would also force even greater complexity on Chinese targeting. That being said, if the United States were to establish multiple bases in Palau, those bases would enjoy mutual support with one another.

The U.S. should also develop airfields on its own territory in the Marianas including those on Guam, Saipan and Tinian. Guam has an excellent port, a naval base and a major Air Force Base. Andersen AFB would be an excellent hub, but right now it is without spokes. Potential spokes include airfields on Guam or in the Northern Marianas Islands.

Orote Field, located on the Navy Base Guam, has a 4,000-foot defunct runway, which could be lengthened and improved. Additionally, being on a navy base gives Orote a measure of security and logistical supportability. However, Orote is limited in its ability to complicate the PRC’s targeting, since Guam is already a likely point of interest for the PRC.

The Northern Marianas Islands (NMI) have two international airports. Tinian and Saipan both have functioning runways exceeding 8,000-feet and are between 120 and 140-miles respectively from Andersen AFB. Both islands also have defunct airfields that could be returned to service to provide a more secure location for military operations, though at higher cost than converting the international airports to dual use facilities. Tinian and Saipan could serve as spokes for the Guamanian hub, and forces in NMI would share a measure of mutual support with forces on Guam. Aircraft based at Guam could reasonably use NMI fields as divert fields. Additionally, Patriot Missile sites on Tinian or Saipan would likely overlap in coverage with those on Guam, forcing China to target multiple mutually supporting bases.

Of course, just because the United States can develop bases in the Philippines, Palau, or Marianas, doesn’t mean it should. Furthermore, additional bases should not just complicate Chinese targeting but they should also improve the United States’ geostrategic position and provide the U.S. with strategic options. Developing additional bases in Palau, the Marianas and eventually the Philippines will help the U.S. ensure the survivability of combat power in the Philippine Sea, enable force projection from the Philippine Sea, and provide multiple lines of operation converging on strategic terrain. Fighter aircraft operating from Palau or the Marianas will be operating at extreme ranges to directly support U.S. operations in support of Taiwan, the SCS or ECS. However, aircraft from Palau or the Marianas could support Navy assets operating in and from the Philippine Sea. For example, USAF fighters could provide fleet defense for a carrier-based force operating in the Philippine Sea, which would free up carrier-based fighters for offensive missions. In some respects this is similar to the concept developed in World War II of having multiple carriers operating together with one as the duty carrier and the other as a strike carrier. Of course, aircraft with longer ranges would be able to carry out independent missions as well.

Bases in Palau and the Marianas would allow the United States to ensure secure lines of communication from the Philippine Sea to key American interests in Taiwan and Okinawa. Additionally, in the event that the Philippines strengthen ties with the PRC, bases in Palau can serve to defend America’s western flank including the lines of communication between the Marianas and Okinawa and Taiwan. If the Philippines returns to the American camp, bases in Palau can help ensure lines of communication to the Philippines. With secure lines of communication, the U.S. could establish base networks in the Philippines to project power into the SCS and toward Taiwan and can look to establish additional basing options around the SCS.

US and Philippines said to be in talks on rocket system to deter Beijing’s ‘militarisation’ in South China SeaSecurity experts say the two sides have been unable to reach a deal because the American system could be too expensive for Manila

Chinese man-made islands on reefs in the disputed Spratly chain would be in striking distance if it’s deployed, according to one analysis

An influential defence think tank has urged the US to deploy the high-mobility artillery rocket system in Southeast Asian countries. 

Washington and Manila have been discussing the potential deployment of an upgraded US rocket system in a bid to deter Beijing’s “militarisation” of its artificial islands in the contested South China Sea, according to regional security experts.

But the two sides have been unable to reach a deal because the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) could be too expensive for Manila given its tight defence budget, they said.

The allies’ defence chiefs, however, reaffirmed their “enduring alliance” on Monday in Washington, and agreed to increase the interoperability of their forces and US support for the modernisation of the Philippines’ armed forces.

The latest reaffirmation echoed US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s mutual defence reassurance in Manila last month, when Pompeo singled out the threat of “China’s island-building and military activities” in the disputed waterway.

If deployed, the long-range, precision-guided rockets fired by the system would be able to strike Chinese man-made islands on reefs in the Spratly chain, one expert said.

The revelation came after an influential defence think tank, the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, warned in a new report that the US’ “freedom of navigation” operations had failed to fundamentally alter Beijing’s course in the South China Sea.

Beijing has reportedly installed anti-ship and surface-to-air missile systems on three artificial islands on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief reefs in the Spratly chain, posing a potential hurdle to US military access in the contested area. It rejected a US demand that the missiles be removed during high-level diplomatic and security talks in Washington in November.

‘Time for tougher deterrence from China’ as US steps up patrols in South China Sea

29 Mar 2019

The think tank’s report released on March 21 urged the US to deploy HIMARS in Southeast Asian countries, which will “demonstrate the flexibility and variability of America’s rotational military presence”.